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OCT 26 1957

General G. C. Thomas, USMC
Director, Net Evaluation Subcommittee
Room 2E915, The Pentagon
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear General Thomas:

At its meeting on 22 October the Intelligence Advisory Committee, in the light of your memorandum of 12 July 1957, considered the question of whether or not the contributions to NIE 11-4-57 or the Board of National Estimates draft of that estimate indicated that there were substantial changes in Soviet gross capabilities. The IAC agreed that the statement set forth below should be forwarded to you at this time.

New intelligence acquired since completion of SNIE 11-6-57, as reflected in the contributions to NIE 11-4-57 and the Board draft of the military section of that estimate, is likely to cause changes in our estimates affecting Soviet gross capabilities for attack on the continental US in mid-1960, as follows:

a. Composition of Long-Range Bomber Force.
Contributions indicate that the estimated composition of the Soviet long-range bomber force in mid-1960 may be considerably different from that given in SNIE 11-6-57. The number of BADGER jet medium bombers may be considerably in excess of the 700 previously estimated, while the number of BISON and BEAR heavy bombers may be considerably fewer than the 800 previously estimated. Such changes in composition would affect the over-all load-carrying capacity of the striking force and the tactics which could be employed in staging and carrying out the attacks.

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b. Availability of ICBM. Contributions indicate that the estimated date of first operational availability of Soviet ICBMs may be earlier than 1960-1961 as previously estimated. Such a change would require inclusion of the ICBM in estimated Soviet intercontinental strike capabilities for mid-1960.

As a result of further analysis, there may also be a small increase in the number of Soviet missile-launching submarines given in SNIE 11-6-57 for mid-1960, but a small decrease in the number of nuclear-powered missile-launching submarines.

Sincerely yours,

Signature

Allen W. Dulles
Chairman
Intelligence Advisory Committee

Drafted in IAC
23 Oct 1957

Distribution:

- O&I - Addressee
- 1 - Mr. Montague
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INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

16 July 1957

MEMORANDUM FOR THE INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

SUBJECT: Review of SNIE 11-6-57

REFERENCE: IAC-M-297, Item 1

1. At the 9 July meeting of the IAC it was tentatively agreed that a formal review of SNIE 11-6-57, "Soviet Gross Capabilities for Attack on the Continental US in Mid-1960," would not be undertaken, subject to General Thomas' confirmation of the members' understanding that, as a practical matter, the NESG would probably not be in a position effectively to use any revision of SNIE 11-6-57 in its forthcoming report.

2. This question has been presented to General Thomas. His reply is attached hereto.

3. This matter will be reconsidered at the 16 July meeting of the IAC, immediately following consideration of Item 1 on the published agenda.



**Author: [Redacted]
[Redacted]**

Attachment

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MEMO
FOR IAC
15 July

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**NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
NET EVALUATION SUBCOMMITTEE**

MEMO
GEN.
Thomas

Office of the Director
Room 2E915, The Pentagon
Washington 25, D.C.

12 July 1957

MEMORANDUM FOR : The Director of Central Intelligence

Subject : Revision of SNIE 11-6-57, "Soviet Gross Capabilities...."

1. Dr. Montague has informed me that the Intelligence Advisory Committee, on 9 July, considered whether to undertake a revision of SNIE 11-6-57 and tentatively decided not to do so, subject to my confirmation of the members' understanding that the NESC, as a practical matter, would probably not be in a position effectively to use such revisions in its forthcoming report."
2. Manifestly, I am not in a position to determine whether the evidence now available requires a revision of SNIE 11-6-57. I am not advised whether, in the judgment of the IAC, a review of SNIE 11-6-57 would now result in a substantially different estimate.
3. The military operations analysis for the 1957 Net Evaluation, based on SNIE 11-6-57, has already been completed. It is too late now for us to go back to the beginning and start all over again. It is not feasible to adjust the complex computations involved to conform to a revised estimative basis. Consequently, the existing military operations analysis will have to be used as it stands, regardless of whether or not SNIE 11-6-57 is revised. However, if the IAC does now in fact have a substantially different appreciation of Soviet gross capabilities, we could and should note that fact in our report and comment on its implications with respect to our calculations. Only the IAC can determine whether this is necessary.

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G. C. THOMAS
General, USMC
Director

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